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ABSTRACT
The organization and implementation of anti-epidemic support in the Polish Armed Forces carry-
ing out mandatory tasks in theatres of military operations poses a difficult and imperceptible
problem in the field of medical assistance of military contingents. One of the operative instru-
ments designed for limitation of the spread of infectious diseases and its health consequences
among participants of military operations is an epidemiological investigation. Analysis of the real
limitations and possibilities in the management of investigative activities constitutes a complex
and varied character of issue. The aim of this paper was to present the legal, diagnostic, and
logistic limitations, including medical treatment, health prevention, and evacuation capabilities,
which determine the practical, medical activities in military operational conditions.
(Int Marit Health 2011; 62, 1: 82–90)
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INTRODUCTION
The basic and legally-binding definition of epide-
miological investigation has been presented in the
Law on preventing and counteracting infections and
contagious diseases in people; it defines the term as
‘detecting a disease, its aetiological factor and deter-
mining causes, sources, reservoirs, and mechanisms
ruling the spread of a contagious disease or an in-
fection’ [1].
A specialized definition of the term may also in-
clude broadly understood stages of epidemiological
investigation: introductory investigation, identification
of all cases, collecting and analysing data, implemen-
ting control measures, notifying the people involved,
and observation [2]. However, the high variability in
cause and effect events, connected with the origin
and spread of an outbreak, results in the fact that
certain, differently defined phases and blurring clearly
outlined borderlines overlap. Specialist literature pre-
sents a more concise description of the term as: de-
tecting causes, sources, and mechanisms of the
spread of diseases. Essentially, such a definition is
a quintessence of this complex and multilayer subject
matter [3, 4]. The analysis of the term in terms of
semantics directs our attention to the word ‘investi-
gation’, which is defined as ‘finding useful informa-
tion, especially after patient and thorough examina-
tion’ [5]. Yet, the common trend of implementing
English words and phrases into current academic
terminology or into everyday language, e.g. repla-
cing the Polish term ‘medycyna zapobiegawcza’ with
the English borrowed ‘medycyna prewencyjna’ (Eng.
preventive medicine), directs the meaning of the term
‘epidemiological investigation’ into the domain of law
— an inquiry/a criminal investigation. Such an asso-
ciation is obviously connected with turning social
attention (since the late 1990s) to newly-defined
threats to biological security, especially the danger
of applying biological agents used in weapons of mass
destruction and international bio-terrorism. Such
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a comparison has also been reflected in expert arti-
cles relating to public health and protection against
the results of bio-terrorism [6]. Upon consideration
of a wide range of possible biological threats to the
security of troops operating overseas, it seems justifi-
able to accept the broader meaning of the concept
‘epidemiological investigation’.
THE AIMS AND PRINCIPLES
OF ANTI-EPIDEMIC SUPPORT
AND EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION
IN MILITARY OPERATIONS
Providing troops with anti-epidemic support in
operational conditions serves two main purposes:
• maintaining combat readiness in the theatre of
operations;
• preventing possible import of infectious diseases
(esp. the most dangerous ones) into a home coun-
try.
In this case, the broadly-understood concept of
combat readiness, with much attention paid to the
human factor, is defined as a series of actions aimed
at preventing the origin and/or spread of infections,
contaminations, or poisoning with a biological agent.
Within the context of the subject matter discussed
in this article, it does not apply to non-infectious di-
seases or diseases of civilization. A comprehensive
execution of the objectives of epidemiological inves-
tigation should focus on different levels of medical
support, and should especially become a part of:
• medical investigation and identifying health ha-
zards prevailing in a particular zone of operations;
• a planning and preparatory phase of a military
operation (including vaccinations and training
concerning sanitary issues);
• active epidemiological supervision within the
framework of medical supervision (including the
issue of self-defence and protection against agents
used as biological weapons);
• medical procedures in case of an outbreak of
mass infection (including the execution of epide-
miological investigations);
• procedures concerning the rotation of military
contingents or concluding a military mission (in-
cluding transport of military personnel from
a mission area into a home country).
A thorough epidemiological preparation of a mili-
tary mission should result in effective protection of
soldiers against the above-mentioned risk factors and
also in the increased awareness among military per-
sonnel of the uniform and most effective course of
action in case an outbreak of an epidemic occurs in
a given territory. When it comes to the organization
of training sessions for medical personnel, the criti-
cal point would be to equip them with the practical
skills needed for conducting an epidemiological in-
vestigation.
The level of training would later be reflected in
the ability to make important and snap decisions in
critical situations. Epidemiological investigation is an
indispensable tool for preventive medical services as
far as providing anti-epidemic support in extraordi-
nary situations is concerned. Practical character, lack
of uniformity, and frequent intuitive actions give rise
to some difficulties in creating consistent medical
procedures. The main aim of introducing such com-
prehensive and specialized procedures of the epide-
miological investigation is to identify the causes of
any diseases of an epidemic character. Another im-
portant objective of the process is to work out and
specify effective anti-epidemic measures the imple-
mentation of which would considerably decrease the
spread of disease. The term ‘disease of an epidemic
character’ used in this article will not be found in
epidemiological jargon, it refers to a practical classifi-
cation used by sanitary services for their organiza-
tional and functional needs when describing an
epidemic. This classification includes:
• an epidemic — the occurrence of diseases, be-
haviours, or other health-related events in num-
bers substantially exceeding what is predicted du-
ring a given period and in a given territory [7];
• an outbreak of food poisoning/infection — the
occurrence, in specific conditions, of two or more
cases of the same infection in humans and/or
developing an infection caused by the same agent,
or the occurrence of such a situation in which
the observed number of cases exceeds what is
expected and all the cases are connected with
one source of food, or there is a likelihood of such
a connection [8];
• detecting at least one case of a particularly dan-
gerous and highly infectious disease — an easily
communicable disease of high mortality rate, cau-
sing major hazards for public health and requi-
ring special medical treatment [1].
The occurrence of one of the above-mentioned
situations should immediately trigger the implemen-
tation of certain epidemiological investigation proce-
dures. The principle elements of the epidemiological
investigation should include:
• confirming the occurrence of a disease of an
epidemic character;
• establishing the definition of the case;
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• active identification of cases;
• description of an outbreak (time, place, population);
• formulating hypotheses (medical differentiation);
• collecting samples for diagnostic tests;
• analysis of the collected data;
• verifying hypotheses;
• listing appropriate anti-epidemic procedures;
• compiling a final report [9, 10].
Determining the source of infection, the routes
of transmission, sensitive population groups, or de-
tecting the etiological factor (a causative biological
agent) remains unchanged regardless of the situa-
tion. However, operational conditions prevailing in the
theatre of war have forced medical personnel to di-
rect their attention to the risk of possible biological
warfare or acts of biological sabotage. Owing to the
extensive range of existing military and medical risk
factors, epidemiological investigation remains a highly
complicated assignment requiring proper expertise
and experience. Therefore, every restriction placed
on the execution of the epidemiological investigation
is a serious impediment to the smooth and effective
detection of etiological factors and the possibility to
get an outbreak of an epidemic under control.
LIMITATIONS TO THE EXECUTION
OF THE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION
The actual limitations to conducting the epidemio-
logical investigation in operational conditions overseas
may be classified into three separate categories:
1. Legal limitations;
2. Diagnostic limitations;
3. Logistic limitations, including:
• medical treatment and health prevention ca-
pabilities,
• evacuation capabilities.
Such a division is a result of grouping different
elements which, from a medical point of view, are
significant as far as conducting epidemiological in-
vestigations and implementing anti-epidemic proce-
dures are concerned. Thus, the focus of the given
classification is on the problem itself rather than on
particular factors. The aim of formulating the list of
basic limitations is to define the risks facing the pro-
cess of epidemiological investigation and to direct
the readers’ attention to the complex character of
such actions.
LEGAL LIMITATIONS
The process of conducting an epidemiological
investigation requires a physician to have conside-
rable knowledge of the subject matter but also to be
familiar with the so-called sanitary law. The term is
informally explained as a set of legal acts relating to
the implementation and execution of sanitary-hygienic
and anti-epidemic regulations. Owing to clearly spe-
cified issues within this domain, it is possible to de-
termine critical points directing a researcher to the
source of an infection or an infection route, to spe-
cify the conclusions concerning the sanitary-hygie-
nic situation, to commission particular diagnostic tests,
and consequently to implement appropriate anti-epi-
demic procedures aimed at bringing the spread of
an infection under control. In the territory of Poland
legally binding acts facilitate the implementation of
certain procedures intended for the prevention of
the origin and spread of infectious diseases, where-
as in operational areas outside Poland such actions
pose a major problem which remains unnoticed. Ar-
ticle 7 of the act of law of 17th December 1998 on
The rules of engagement or deployment of the Armed
Forces of the Republic of Poland abroad [11] speci-
fies the possibility to refer and apply legal acts which
are valid in the territory of Poland to the theatre of
war abroad:
1. Military personnel assigned to a temporary
duty assignment overseas are subject to the crimi-
nal and disciplinary law which is in force in the terri-
tory of the Republic of Poland;
2. Soldiers and civilians employed in military units
deployed overseas are committed to observe the law
which is valid in the territory of the receiving country
and the international law which is binding in Poland.
Considering the fact that legal acts relating to
broadly understood concept of sanitary law and
health prevention procedures cannot be easily clas-
sified in relation to disciplinary or criminal law, it would
be justifiable to apply legal regulations which are valid
in the territory of the receiving country within this
domain. It would not pose any problem if combat
operations were conducted in the territory of the EU.
However, while conducting military operations in coun-
tries characterized by totally different culture, social
conditions, geography, climate, or legal regulations,
such as Iraq, Chad, or Afghanistan, the implementa-
tion of the local law within this domain is extremely
difficult if not impossible. In extreme cases, local law
cannot be applied at all, as it simply does not exist in
the territories of certain countries. Similarly, the law
of a receiving country cannot be observed if combat
operations are aimed at overthrowing the existing
government and administrative bodies which could
enforce appropriate legal regulations. If all Polish re-
gulations concerning sanitary-hygienic and anti-epi-
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demic support were classified as ‘order law’, or if
chosen acts of law and orders of ministers were ap-
plied as a whole, it would have serious repercussions,
including bringing any military activity to a halt. In
particular, it applies to clearly specified requirements
relating to supervision and diagnostics, which are
impossible to fulfil outside Poland due to technical
or organizational problems. On the other hand, the
absence of a legally binding definition of ‘order law’
may effectively prevent the introduction of all regula-
tions required by the Polish law, being one coherent
system, since not every act of administrative law can
be interpreted as ‘order law’. The absence of admi-
nistrative regulations for certain acts of law, which
would specify the scope of Polish law to be observed
in operational areas overseas, and most importantly,
the necessity to introduce the best and the most
rational solutions, requires, in this case, referral to
military regulations created to satisfy the demands
of a particular mission or to implement legally bin-
ding acts (including military law) of lesser importance.
The fundamental document defining the aims and
procedures to be followed within an operational area
is the Operations Plan (OPLAN). Among other things,
it includes an annex containing information about
the organization and execution of medical support.
Owing to its general and concise character it is im-
possible to find in this document any detailed infor-
mation regarding medical issues, e.g. the rules of
conducting epidemiological investigation. It also re-
fers to the Operations Order (OPORD) formulated on
the basis of the OPLAN. Some of the contemporary
military missions are supplemented with special me-
dial manuals. In case of all the UN operations it is
‘The Medical Support Manual for the United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations’ [12]. There are also
a number of other medical handbooks created for
military purposes; some are devoted to a specific
military mission, e.g. ‘The medical support manual
for the EUFOR Chad/The Central African Republic
peacekeeping operation’ [13]. All such manuals pro-
vide support on the merits of the subject matter as
well as on the organization of medical procedures;
however, they do not specify how the specialized pro-
cedures should be carried out. For such a purpose,
detailed instructions and lists of procedures should
be applied. For the period of the execution of allied
operations conducted within the NATO framework,
the basis for cooperation and decision-making are
documents implemented by the Republic of Poland.
They include doctrinal documents (AJP, AMED, etc.)
and procedural documents (STANAG). The docu-
ments secure the execution of the medial investiga-
tion and the maintenance of appropriate sanitary-
-hygienic standards on condition that they have been
translated and specially adapted for the capabilities
of national contingents and then effectively imple-
mented. However, NATO regulations do not provide
a legal basis for United Nations peacekeeping opera-
tions or military operations conducted under the
auspices of the European Union. In the case of all
EU missions, procedural documents are created in-
dependently but with some reference to NATO source
materials. The absence of a uniform system within
this domain with reference to anti-epidemic support
provided within NATO, UN, or EU operations consti-
tutes a serious problem when quoting particular laws
or trying to enforce certain regulations in a uniform
and invariable way. A complete catalogue of legal
regulations valid within the territory of Poland is de-
monstrated in the Constitution of the Republic of Po-
land (Chapter 3: ‘Sources of legal acts’). In the case
of EU countries, all European legal regulations are
clearly defined, whereas in the case of other organi-
zations with Polish membership, such as NATO or
the UN, precisely defined acts of law do not exist. As
a result, normative documents issued by the above-
mentioned organizations are in contradiction to le-
gally binding acts of law observed in Poland. There-
fore, normative regulations issued by suitable insti-
tutions functioning within international organizations
cannot replace acts of law. This becomes a serious
problem when, on the grounds of normative acts,
which according to the Constitution of the Republic
of Poland are not legal acts, there is an obligation to
limit certain rights or impose duties on citizens. Such
events can occur while dealing with an epidemic
outbreak (quarantine, isolation). The situation is even
more complicated if a foreign citizen has to follow
the procedures which were imposed on him/her. In
an attempt to standardize epidemiological investiga-
tions, including the possibility to refer to specific le-
gal regulations, one could look for solutions in the
MASCAL plan, i.e. a list of procedures to be followed
in case an event of medical character occurs on
a mass scale. Such a document, however, is typically
intended for emergency events, such as bombard-
ment, a plane crash, or a terrorist attack, and it does
not include detailed medical procedures within the
field of epidemiological investigation or guidelines for
dealing with an epidemic outbreak. Although the
document is a collection of organizational rules, it
also involves rules of engagement for equal and su-
perior institutions while coping with medical events
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which exceed the capabilities of a given medical eva-
cuation level. Owing to the fact that specific solutions
and guidelines for practical execution of epidemio-
logical investigation are missing, Standing Operational
Procedures (SOP) could be applied. They should in-
volve precise information on anti-epidemic support
and procedures. Regrettably, such documents are
generally compiled by medical personnel participa-
ting in military operations but with no expertise in
epidemiology or related fields. Standing Operational
Procedures created for the purpose of a military mis-
sion should be based on source documents being
an exponent of law. Yet, taking into consideration the
aforementioned difficulties in referring to acts of law
or legal orders, the only applicable documents in such
situations remain detailed military instructions ap-
proved by the Minister of National Defence, Chief of
General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, or other
specialist ministerial instructions and military norma-
tive documents. At this point another difficulty ari-
ses, namely, the number of possible references is
insufficient. The basic source of knowledge for re-
searchers dealing with epidemiological investigation
has not changed for the last 30 years, and it has
been ‘Instruction — sanitary-hygienic and anti-epi-
demic support for the armed forces in times of war
and peace’ [14], the ‘Military Epidemiology’ [15], and
the ‘Military Hygiene’ [16] textbook. Nonetheless,
none of these textbooks was created for the purpose
of the theatre of contemporary war. It should be men-
tioned that certain actions aimed at creating specia-
lized regulations concerning selected issues of sani-
tary-hygienic and anti-epidemic support of military
missions have already been taken [17]. However, com-
prehensive solutions to the problem or specialized
ministerial publications to be used as an interpreta-
tion of present-day legal regulations and operational
conditions are still missing. Existing instructions crea-
ted for NATO purposes [18, 19] and national military
textbooks [20] could provide a sound basis or a point
of reference for creating systematic solutions in the
domain of anti-epidemic prevention in the Polish Armed
Forces. Such documents, in compilation with certain
acts of law, could successfully be used as a founda-
tion for creating uniform procedures in the form of
specialized military instructions.
DIAGNOSTIC LIMITATIONS
Limited diagnostic capabilities are the primary
constraint on formulating final results of epidemio-
logical investigations conducted in a mission area.
The main cause of the situation is undoubtedly the
complexity of medical analytics. This extensive field
of science includes microbiology, virology, parasitolo-
gy, and other specific fields. A leading role in the
area of field diagnostics has been assigned to micro-
biology. This is primarily the result of two reasons
that are crucial in operational conditions:
• therapeutic reason — the fastest possible identifi-
cation of the biological agent causing an infec-
tion, in order to implement effective medical treat-
ment;
• military reason — informing the commander about
the essence of a mass-scale health hazard and
its expected consequences as fast as possible.
Providing the full range of diagnostic facilities (that
are available in Poland) in an overseas mission area
is completely impossible. This relates to the absence
of qualified personnel (the necessity to employ many
specialists in such fields of medical diagnostics) and
to the lack of appropriate materials (the necessity to
supply medical personnel with expensive but fragile
specialized equipment). Given the circumstances,
obtaining the appropriate level of diagnostic facilities
should always reflect the specific requirements iden-
tified in a risk analysis and medical investigation re-
port. On the grounds of the data mentioned above, it
is necessary to elaborate a wide range of portable
laboratory diagnostics, such as portable PCR (poly-
merase chain reaction) or field diagnostic assay kits
for the detection of specific pathogens, which can
be a practical epidemiological tool for rapid analysis
of the occurrence of potential threats. Yet another
important issue within this domain is the diagnosti-
cian’s knowledge of certain procedures, i.e. isola-
ting, differentiating, or recognizing a pathogen and
an interdisciplinary ability to prepare and process sam-
ples of different origin (biomedical, environmental
— including specimens of air, food, and water). Typical-
ly, diagnosticians are skilled in a specific field of re-
search work, e.g. biomedical clinical research, sani-
tary and epidemiologic research or environmental
research. As a result, one diagnostician cannot be
expected to have the total ability to conduct microbi-
ological genetic research and parasitological assess-
ment of direct preparations as well as the ability
to carry out a comprehensive physicochemical ana-
lysis of water. The necessity to perform certain labo-
ratory tests (and the range of such tests) should be
determined by a person conducting the epidemio-
logical investigation. Additional tests carried out in
the process of the epidemiological investigation form
the basis for performing an analysis, verifying hypo-
theses which have been constructed, and defining
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specific anti-epidemic procedures to be implemen-
ted in order to increase epidemiological effectiveness
in an outbreak. Furthermore, some of the medical
risks that were identified in a military mission area
could require the implementation of additional diag-
nostic facilities, which go beyond the routine and
legally approved procedures. Field testing into par-
ticularly dangerous biological agents or tests for the
presence of cysts of intestinal parasites in drinking
water represent an example of diagnostic procedures
which had not been regulated according to law (in
a form of the Polish Norm or the Defence Norm) and
are conducted without specialized and uniform mi-
litary instructions. Considering the fact that such la-
boratory tests would be of little practical use in Po-
land, it would be sensible to introduce uniform norms,
patterns, and diagnostic procedures of a typically
military character. The given norms and regulations
could be based on international literature and well-
functioning standards implemented by NATO specia-
lists. Also, one needs to keep in mind that in opera-
tional conditions test results cannot be verified in
a referential laboratory. This creates a serious prob-
lem if a sudden biological attack occurs (biological
weapons, bioterrorism, or biological sabotage). Then
the ability to collect appropriate environmental or
biomedical samples, their correct preservation, pa-
cking, labelling, and transportation [21] together with
the results of laboratory tests conducted in field con-
ditions may turn out to be a decisive factor as far as
undertaking or abandoning certain preventive mea-
sures or the necessity to take retaliatory actions is
concerned. This may potentially give rise to some
serious legal and military implications, which could
be grounded on both the information gathered by
operational intelligence and the data obtained
through laboratory tests, in the conclusions of the
epidemiological investigation. As a consequence, it
is necessary to introduce uniform procedures rela-
ting to the issue of collecting specimens and con-
ducting diagnostic tests which should be based on
concrete instructions — executive acts of law approved
to be implemented in the armed forces. Creating and
implementing such legal regulations could also faci-
litate cooperation between different components of
the Polish Armed Forces, e.g. the Biological Recon-
naissance Section of the Military Preventive Medi-
cine Centres, Epidemiological Reaction Units from the
Epidemiological Reaction Centres of the Polish Armed
Forces, and the Mobile Biological Laboratory from
the Contamination Analysis Centre. The problem is
not merely a theoretical deliberation. A good exam-
ple of such a joint investigation into the possible risk
of an attack with biological weapons was the research
carried out in the territory of Iraq in 2003 conduc-
ted by the Mobile Biological Laboratory (whose staff
are directly subordinate to the Chief of Medical Ser-
vices of the Multinational Division Centre South [22]),
sample-takers from the chemical platoon, and a re-
connaissance component. The accepted course of
action in a given situation is based on an AEP 10
source document ‘NATO handbook for sampling and
identification of biological and chemical agents’. This
document, however, has not been converted into the
form of a military instruction, which could be enforced
in all mobile sample-taking and laboratory units.
Another significant issue, as far diagnostic proce-
dures are concerned, is the specific character of cer-
tain diseases prevalent in a given geographical area.
The peacekeeping mission conducted in Cambodia
(1992–1993) and the mission conducted in Chad
(2008–2009) made the researchers realize the scale
of health problems and variety of epidemiological risks
resulting from the medical geography of a specific
operational area [23]. Therefore, it is necessary to
consider geographical differences existing in areas
where military operations are to be deployed while
preparing medical support of a given mission. Wor-
king out effective prevention measures will logically be
reflected in the speed at which medical assistance is
provided to the sick. The introduction of mobile sam-
ple-taking units will make it possible to exercise labo-
ratory supervision over the components of level 1
medical support, and more importantly it will enable
medical personnel to provide full diagnostic support
without the necessity to employ more medical staff.
The accepted procedures will lead to a significant
decrease in the rate of non-battle sanitary losses be-
ing the effect of the occurrence of diseases charac-
teristic of a given area, as well as optimizing the activi-
ties undertaken by medical services. Therefore, the
essence of the proposed actions is to create such dia-
gnostic facilities which would provide assistance in
dealing with specific epidemiological risks identified
in the process of epidemiological investigation.
LOGISTICAL LIMITATIONS
Providing equipment and preparing provisions for
a military mission is a massive undertaking. Its effi-
ciency may determine whether certain combat ope-
rations are a failure or a success. The essence of pro-
viding appropriate operational support and long-term
defence planning is the ability to estimate sanitary
losses [24]. For that reason, the success of a military
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mission will largely depend on the ability to predict
the exact amount and quality of necessary equip-
ment and materials as well as supplying military per-
sonnel deployed in an operational area with the
exact amount of provisions. The variety of renewable
gear and equipment in today’s battlefield forces lo-
gistics units to be aware of and to follow a number of
norms, regulations, and tables of amounts due. It
also requires logisticians to have some specialized
knowledge about the demands of particular servi-
ces and to be able to deal with any shortages in this
respect as quickly as possible.
Health prevention and therapeutic problems
Medical logistics determines the scope of respon-
sibility and capabilities of medical services by setting
the standards of multi-level treatment and medical
evacuation of the sick and wounded into subsequent
levels of medical aid. The standards of equipment
necessary to provide first aid, and qualified and spe-
cialized medical assistance in all medical centres is
clearly defined and recorded in documents of uni-
versal [25] or short-term and dedicated character;
whereas, such uniform and standardized require-
ments relating to anti-epidemic support, laboratory
diagnostics, or sanitary-hygienic protection in the
form of consistent regulations or medical instructions
simply do not exist. It is then reflected in the limited
ability to carry out epidemiological investigations or
the implementation of proper prevention measures,
and consequently in the speed of dealing with an
epidemic outbreak and protecting people in danger.
The most serious problem which medical services
functioning in the theatre of operations have to face
remains the absence of regulations relating to pro-
curement of disinfection agents, laboratory reagents,
medications, and materials used for anti-epidemic
support. Under such circumstances, an outbreak of
an infectious epidemic requires the implementation
of nonstandard procedures. Additionally, if there are
severe shortages of indispensible medical supplies
or if medical services are forced to wait for a long
time for the delivery of urgent materials and equip-
ment, the situation may become dangerous. Delays
in implementing anti-epidemic procedures will result
in an increased risk of the spread of a disease. Also,
one needs to consider certain limitations in delive-
ring supplies into an area of deployment arising from
environmental conditions, e.g. impassable roads or
closed airfields during the rainy season. In such ca-
ses, it is necessary for medical personnel of the con-
tingent to maintain the appropriate level of supplies
termed DOS (Days of Supply). At present, there are
no regulations that would enable medical personnel
to calculate and then to maintain a standardized
reserve of drugs and medical materials in a mission
area. Hence, regulations issued by a superior as to
the amount of DOS to be maintained poses yet an-
other significant problem concerning the issue of
proper evaluation and providing material supplies for
military personnel participating in mission through-
out the mass infections which medical services ope-
rating in a theatre of military activities have to con-
front. In addition to this, a great number of problems
occurring in the field of the vaccination schedule
significantly diminish the capabilities of anti-epide-
mic support. The absence of an effective mechanism
which would deprive some of the military personnel
who had not been vaccinated or had only been par-
tially vaccinated, according to legally binding regula-
tions, from being relocated overseas results in a num-
ber of difficulties, especially as far as arranging
a vaccination schedule is concerned. The medical ser-
vices of a military mission are rarely aware of the ex-
act number of people arriving in the zone of ope-
rations who will require basic vaccinations; therefore,
preparing the right amount of vaccines to be used in
a mission area in extraordinary situations or to be
used as a booster dose is unfeasible. Apart from the
fact that maintaining the proper standards of trans-
portation (vaccines kept in refrigerators) may not be
possible in operational conditions (no credible reports
on actual conditions of transportation in military mis-
sion areas, e.g. in Afghanistan) or the fact that due
to a vaccine injury some soldiers might be incapable
of performing their tasks for several days after ha-
ving been vaccinated, the fact remains that the most
serious threat in this respect is the risk of an out-
break of an epidemic among those who have not
been vaccinated. A possible solution to this problem
would be to create a system of medical supervision
which would be composed of a central register of
the vaccination schedule and an electronic database
of medical records of military personnel serving in
the Polish Armed Forces. Implementing such a solu-
tion has been proposed and discussed, but unfortu-
nately the plan has not been executed until now.
Problems with medical evacuation
Each patient who has been diagnosed with a di-
sease or sustained an injury but cannot be effectively
treated at a given level of medical support (owing to
limited diagnostic or therapeutic capabilities available
at this level) should be evacuated to a higher level.
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The principles which govern the process of medical
evacuation seem to be clear; however, a problem
occurs if one takes into consideration the fact that
a patient who is about to be evacuated may be in-
fected with a contagious pathogen. Owing to the long
incubation period of certain pathogens (from the
moment of becoming infected until the occurrence
of the first symptoms of the disease) it is possible
that the first cases of mass infections will go unno-
ticed. This results in the necessity to increase the
number of tasks of the personnel in charge of carry-
ing out medical investigations. It is also a great im-
pediment to the implementation of comprehensive
anti-epidemic procedures. Upon considering situa-
tions of this kind it seems logical that in certain ca-
ses there is a need to establish ‘transitory camps’
where soldiers could be stationed before being home-
bound. While in a transitory camp they would not be
directly engaged in combat operations and thus
would not be put at risk of developing certain disea-
ses. The waiting time before returning to a home coun-
try would be a specific form of quarantine and its
duration would be determined by the head of the
medical service on the grounds of information in-
cluded in the medical history of a patient (typically it
should not exceed 5–14 days). The best solution
would be to be set up transitory camps in the vicinity
of at least level 2 medical centres, thus avoiding the
necessity to evacuate serious cases to a higher level
of medical treatment. In case of an outbreak of in-
fectious disease in an operational area the funda-
mental issue is to decide whether serious cases
should be isolated on the spot or if medevac proce-
dures, requiring the evacuation of the sick to a home
country, ought to be implemented [26]. The answer
to this question seems obvious, as the specific cha-
racter of a military mission make it easier to concen-
trate infected patients in one place. As a result, the
process of epidemiological investigation could ne-
cessarily be focused in a specific place in the the-
atre of operations. Moreover, the absence of natio-
nal diagnostic and treatment facilities of biosafety le-
vel 4 unit (BSL-4), which would be capable of detecting
and identifying all specifically dangerous pathogens
of group A, would not only make it impossible to elimi-
nate the risks within this domain in the territory of
Poland, but more importantly could facilitate the
spread of infectious diseases. A potential resolution
to this problem could be the introduction of so-called
‘bio-boxes’ used as a means of isolating the sick. Yet,
without any doubt, the primary task of health servi-
ces should be to prevent the import of infectious di-
seases to Poland. This could be achieved by con-
centrating mass-scale infections in the territory of
a military operation, carrying out epidemiological in-
vestigations, implementing anti-epidemic procedures,
and eventually bringing an outbreak of an epidemic
under control. The execution of the entire program
connected with the occurrence of mass infections
needs to be clearly defined in the MASCAL plans
and should allow for the principles of medical (spe-
cialized) support with its limitations as to the imple-
mentation of medical evacuation of patients from the
territory of an outbreak.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Epidemiological investigation is a practical tool as
far as the execution of anti-epidemic support of
military missions conducted abroad is concerned.
The rules applied to the implementation of inves-
tigation procedures should allow for the possible
risk of using biological agents and the specific
character of all natural health hazards prevailing
in a given theatre of operations.
2. The major problem in implementing standardized
prevention measures are all kinds of limitations
as well as the absence of legal regulations appli-
cable to operational conditions as far as anti-epi-
demic support is concerned.
3. Diagnostic and logistic limitations relating to anti-
epidemic support ought to be minimized by di-
recting the attention of medical services to the
specific character of medical requirements in
a given military operation. And medical investiga-
tion should be applied as a chief instrument for
supporting this goal.
4. Existing procedures and handbooks issued by
NATO member countries, along with acts of the
Polish law, should provide the basis for formula-
ting the national system of anti-epidemic support
in the form of military instructions.
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